We present a protocol for quantum cryptography in which the data obtained for mismatched bases are used in full for the purpose of quantum state tomography. Eavesdropping on the quantum channel is seriously impeded by requiring that the outcome of the tomography is consistent with unbiased noise in the channel. We study the incoherent eavesdropping attacks that are still permissible and establish under which conditions a secure cryptographic key can be generated. The whole analysis is carried out for channels that transmit quantum systems of any finite dimension.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of quantum cryptography is the distribution of a secure cryptographic key between two parties, traditionally called Alice and Bob. The key consists of a truly random sequence of ''letters.'' The most important among the schemes proposed for this purpose-the 1984 protocol of Bennitt and Brassard ͑BB84͒ ͓1͔, and the 1991 protocol of Ekert's ͑E91͒ ͓2͔-and all experimentally realized schemes ͑Refs. ͓3-7͔, in particular, but also others͒ use a binary alphabet, i.e., just two letters that are usually denoted by the numbers 0 and 1. A very readable account of the state of this art is the recent review paper by Gisin et al. ͓8͔ .
Binary keys suffice, of course, for all practical purposes and they are relatively easily generated with the aid of binary quantum alternatives ͑qubits͒. In fact, the selected experiments cited above provide increasing evidence that it may be commercially viable to introduce feasible quantum cryptographic systems in the near future.
The utter simplicity of the kinematics of a qubit, the most elementary quantum degree of freedom, facilitates both the theoretical analysis and the experimental implementations. And yet, there is a natural curiosity about schemes for quantum cryptography that exploit richer degrees of freedom, especially ternary quantum alternatives ͑quutrits, for threeletter keys͒, and generally n-fold quantum alternatives ͑qunits, for n-letter keys with nϭ2, 3,4, . . . ) .
Almost all qunit schemes are generalizations of the familiar BB84 and E91 qubit protocols ͓9-12͔, and we deal with a particular generalization of E91 in the present paper. It is worth mentioning, however, that there is also at least one higher-dimensional scheme of quite a different kind, namely, the deterministic protocol of Beige et al. ͓13͔ , in which fourdimensional systems ͑pairs of qubits, for instance͒ are used for the generation of a binary key.
The BB84 and E91 protocols are indeterministic because key letters are only obtained when Alice's and Bob's measurement bases match and, therefore, a substantial fraction of the data is not used at all ͑in BB84͒ or used just for security checks ͑in E91͒. In the protocol we analyze here, all measurement results for mismatched bases are exploited for complete quantum state tomography, by which Alice and Bob manage to impose very stringent conditions on the quantum channel and so limit eavesdropper Eve's possibilities substantially.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II the stage is set by defining the tomographic protocol. Then we analyze, in Sec. III, what the eavesdropper can do and achieve, which prepares the subsequent determination of the security criterion in Sec. IV. We close with a summary of our results and a critical discussion of some crucial details.
II. THE TOMOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL
We consider a setup of the kind sketched in Fig. 1 . A source emits entangled pairs of qunits to Alice and Bob, who receive one qunit each of every pair. The qunits distributed by the source in this manner constitute an effective quantum FIG. 1. Schematic setup of the key distribution system. Alice and Bob are connected to each other by an effective quantum channel, which consists of a source that distributes entangled qunit pairs. For each qunit, Alice measures one of her tomographically complete observables, chosen at random when the qunit arrives. Bob does the same for each of his qunits. They exchange well-chosen information about their measurements through a classical channel, and conclude then whether or not the quantum channel has the right characteristics to allow for the generation of a secure cryptographic key from their raw data. In their security analysis, Alice and Bob assume that all imperfections of the quantum channel result from eavesdropper Eve's intervention and, to be on the safe side, they grant Eve full control of the source. channel between Alice and Bob ͑A&B͒, although these two users are not themselves sending any quantum systems to each other. As a consequence of unavoidable imperfections, both in the functioning of the source and in the transmission line, this quantum channel will be noisy to some extent, so that A&B will not receive qunit pairs with the ideal properties they hope for. Nevertheless, they will be able to generate a secure cryptographic key if the noise level is below a certain threshold. But to be on the safe side, they must determine this threshold level under the assumption that all imperfections result from their adversary Eve's intervention, who eavesdrops on the communication between A&B. In particular, one must grant Eve full control over the qunit-pair source, and she will try to know as much about the qunits detected by A&B as the laws of physics allow her to know.
After receiving a qunit from the source, Alice measures a nondegenerate observable that she selects at random from her set of nϩ1 tomographically complete observables ͓14,15͔. She keeps a private record of the observables she measures and of the outcomes of her measurements. Likewise, Bob measures on each of his qunits an observable randomly chosen from his corresponding set, and keeps a record of his data as well. We adopt the notation of Ref. ͓20͔ and denote by ͉m k ͘ the kth eigenket of Alice's mth observable and by ͉m k ͘ the kth eigenket of Bob's mth observable. The correspondence between the two sets of observables, or rather between the orthonormal measurement bases they provide, is then established by requiring that
hold for j,kϭ0,1,2, . . . ,nϪ1 and mϭ0,1,2, . . . ,n. In short, the roles of bras and kets are interchanged.
Ideally, A&B wish to receive from the source the maximally entangled two-qunit state ͉͘ that is specified by
͑2͒
As a consequence of Eq. ͑1͒, it has the same form regardless of the pair of observables that is used to define it. When the transmission is over, A&B announce their choice of observables, their respective m values, for all qunits through a public channel. They can then divide the detected qunit pairs into two groups, one in which the measurement bases match ͓both m values are the same, which happens with a probability of 1/(nϩ1)], and the other in which the bases do not match. In the absence of noise, the measurement results of the first group ͑the respective k values-referred to as nit values͒ are perfectly correlated and thus give rise to a cryptographic key in an alphabet with n letters.
In reality, however, A&B must take into account Eve's attempts at eavesdropping and the resulting disturbance of the quantum channel. As a consequence thereof, the statistical properties of the detected qunit pairs will not be correctly described by the pure two-qunit state of Eq. ͑2͒. Rather than the projector ͉͉͗͘, an appropriate statistical operator applies to the qunit pairs emitted by a nonideal source.
Since A&B measure tomographically complete sets of observables on their respective qunits, they can determine the actual two-qunit state from their measurement results. They exploit all data of the mismatched bases for this purpose, and some of the matched-bases data. Ideally, they wish for the projector ͉͉͗͘ but, realistically, they expect to find a of the form
which is what one gets when an imperfect transmission line admixes unbiased noise to ͉͉͗͘. The non-negative parameters ␤ 0 and ␤ 1 have the following physical significance: ␤ 0 is the probability that Alice and Bob get the same nit value when the bases match, and ␤ 1 is the probability that Bob gets a particular one of the nϪ1 values that are different from Alice's nit value. Formally, is a nonnegative operator of unit trace, and thus permissible as a statistical operator, whenever 0 р␤ 1 /␤ 0 рn/(nϪ1). But only values in the range
correspond to an admixture of symmetric noise to ͉͉͗͘ and, therefore, this is the parameter range of interest. The limiting values mark the extreme situations of ''no noise at all'' (␤ 0 ϭ1, ␤ 1 ϭ0) and ''nothing but noise'' (␤ 0 ϭ␤ 1 ϭ1/n).
Sources that emit two-qunit states of a kind different from Eq. ͑3͒ are not regarded as trustworthy by Alice and Bob. As the crucial, defining step of the tomographic protocol, they thus accept the raw key sequence only if their state tomography confirms that the source emits a two-qunit state of form ͑3͒. Otherwise, they reject the data wholly and use a different source.
III. EAVESDROPPING A. Choosing the right ancilla states
By imposing this rather stringent requirement, A&B restrict Eve's possibilities markedly. Her strategy is to keep a quantum record of what she sends to A&B by entangling each qunit pair with an ancilla ͑an auxiliary system of her liking͒, and to perform a judiciously chosen measurement on the ancilla after carefully weighing the information ex-changed by A&B through the public channel. Quite generally, Eve's option is to prepare an entangled pure state of the form
where the ͉Ẽ kl (m) ͘'s are the unnormalized kets of the ancilla states attached by Eve ͑with reference to the mth pair of A&B's observables͒. Since there is no advantage in generating a mixed state instead, it is sufficient to consider all such pure-state preparations. Now, the two-qunit state received by A&B is obtained by tracing ͉⌿͗͘⌿͉ over the ancilla degree of freedom, and their insistence on getting of Eq. ͑3͒ implies that Eve must choose her ancilla states such that they obey
͑6͒
The right-hand side does not depend on the m value to which the ancilla states on the left refer and, therefore, the mapping ͉Ẽ kl (m) ͘→͉Ẽ kl (mЈ) ͘ is unitary. Quite explicitly, two different sets of ancilla states are related to each other by
which is an immediate consequence of Eqs. ͑5͒ and ͑1͒. As a check of consistency, one can exploit the completeness and orthonormality of the single-qunit states ͉m k ͘ to verify rather easily that Eq. ͑6͒ holds for any m value, if it holds for one of them. In summary, then, it does not matter which m value Eve chooses in Eq. ͑5͒. It is expedient to introduce normalized ancilla states ͉E kl
if kϭkЈ and lϭlЈ,
͑10͒
As stated in Eq. ͑9͒, for each m value, the ancilla states ͉E kl (m) ͘ with k l are orthogonal to each other and orthogonal to the ones with kϭl. The latter are not orthogonal among themselves ͑except when ␤ 1 ϭ␤ 0 , the case of pure noise and of very little interest͒, but rather have the same inner products for all pairs,
The n ancilla states ͉E kk (m) ͘ are thus linearly independent, except when ␤ 1 ϭ0, which is the ideal situation of no noise at all, that is, no eavesdropping ͓27͔.
B. Ancilla subspaces
This exception aside, the kϭl ancilla states ͉E kk
an n-dimensional subspace that is orthogonal to the (n 2 Ϫn)-dimensional subspace spanned by the k l states. We refer to them as the first and the second subspace, respectively. The subspaces associated with different m values are related to each other by the unitary transformations of Eq. ͑7͒. Eve takes advantage of the structure of these subspaces in the eavesdropping attack that we now proceed to describe. We shall deal solely with attacks, in which she performs measurements on the ancillas one by one, commonly termed incoherent attacks. By contrast, in a coherent attack, she would measure some joint observables of a few, or perhaps many, ancillas ͓28͔. This limitation is mainly dictated by the technical difficulties that one faces when analyzing coherent attacks. We note, however, that some have argued-notably Cirac and Gisin ͓29͔, and Wang ͓30͔-that coherent attacks are not more powerful than incoherent attacks, but their arguments refer rather explicitly to protocols of the BB84 type, with intercept-resend eavesdropping attacks, and are not immediately applicable to our tomographic qunit protocol.
Eve's incoherent eavesdropping procedure is as follows. The information exchanged by A&B over the classical channel identifies those qunit pairs that contribute to the raw key sequence, the ones for which Alice's m value is the same as Bob's. To find out, as much as she can, about the nit values that A&B have recorded for each of these matched qunit pairs, Eve performs a suitably chosen measurement on the respective ancillas, one at a time. The statistical operator for one of these ancillas is obtained by tracing ͉⌿͗͘⌿͉ over the qunit degrees of freedom, with the outcome
where m identifies the matched pair of bases. The first summation corresponds to the situation, in which A&B get the same nit value and the ancilla ends up in the first subspace, which happens with probability ␤ 0 . And the situation of differing nit values, when the final ancilla state is in the second subspace, is accounted for by the second summation, which carries the complementary weight of (nϪ1)␤ 1 ϭ1Ϫ␤ 0 .
Since the various Eve (m) 's (mϭ0,1, . . . ,n) are unitarily equivalent, it is sufficiently general to consider just one m value. For notational simplicity, we leave it implicit from here on and suppress the m label. Then we have
͑15͒
The first of these conditional statistical operators, (ϭ) , applies when A&B have the same nit value and the second, ( ) , applies when they do not. Since (ϭ) and ( ) reside in the first and second subspaces, respectively, Eve can discriminate between the two situations unambiguously.
Suppose she thus establishes that different nit values are the case. Under this circumstance, she performs a measurement that distinguishes between the k l ancilla states, which is surely possible because they are mutually orthogonal. She finds the ancilla in the state with ket ͉E kl ͘, say, and then knows with certainty that Alice's nit value is k and Bob's is l ͑with k l, of course͒.
By contrast, if Eve establishes that the nit values of A&B are the same, she cannot find out with certainty what is this common value because the kϭl ancilla states are not orthogonal to each other, except when the ␤ 1 ϭ␤ 0 limit is reached in Eq. ͑4͒ and the right-hand side vanishes in Eq.
͑11͒.
For ␤ 1 Ͻ␤ 0 , Eve's attempts in discerning the nonorthogonal ͉E kk ͘ ancilla states in the first subspace are prone to error.
Recalling Eq. ͑11͒, we note that the inner product for each pair of them is the same positive number, just like it is for the vectors pointing from the tip of a pyramid to the corners at its base. It is known that the error-minimizing measurement for such ''pyramid states'' is the so-called square-root measurement ͑see, e.g., Refs. ͓31,32͔ and the pertinent references therein, in particular Refs. ͓33,34͔͒. Although demonstrating this optimality requires a careful argument, it is easy to grasp the basic idea of a square-root measurement.
C. Square-root measurement
For the following, up to and including Eq. ͑27͒, we restrict the discussion to the first subspace. Then, the n kets 
͑17͒
and thus define a generalized measurement-the square-root measurement. Now note the eigenvalue equations
so that
The eigenvalue r 0 is nondegenerate, whereas r 1 is (nϪ1)-fold, and not n-fold, because the n kets in Eq. ͑18b͒ have a vanishing sum. We make use of these eigenvalues in writing
and then exploit Eq. ͑18͒ to establish
͑22͒
The parameters 0 and 1 that appear in the probability amplitudes
are crucial, inasmuch as they quantify Eve's knowledge about the common nit value of A&B: Upon finding ͉e kk ͘, she knows that the actual nit value is k with probability 0 , and that it is either one of the nϪ1 other values with probability 1 . In conjunction with Eq. ͑20͒, the required normalization 0 ϩ͑nϪ1 ͒ 1 ϭ1
͑24͒
follows immediately from the explicit expressions
The implied identity
is worth noting. We close the discussion of the square-root measurement in the first subspace with the observation that Eve's reference states ͉e kk ͘ are orthonormal, ͗e kk ͉e ll ͘ϭ␦ kl .
͑27͒
As a consequence, the generalized measurement defined by decomposition ͑17͒ is in fact a standard von Neumann measurement. Now returning to the general discussion of the full statistical operator ͑13͒, we summarize Eve's strategy as follows. She performs a measurement that distinguishes the n 2 states ͓35͔ ͉e kl ͘ϭ ͭ as given in Eq. ͑ 22͒ for kϭl,
which are orthonormal. With probability (nϪ1)␤ 1 ϭ1Ϫ␤ 0 she finds a state with k l, and then infers that Alice's nit value is k, and Bob's is l. And when Eve finds a kϭl state, which happens with probability ␤ 0 , she knows that A&B have the same nit value and can guess it right with probability 0 , but will guess a particular one of the nϪ1 wrong values with probability 1 .
D. Probabilities
In more formal terms, the joint probability that, for matched bases, Alice gets nit value k, Bob gets l, and Eve detects ͉e k Ј l Ј ͘ is given by
͑29͒
All reduced and conditional probabilities are derived from this expression by partial summation and normalization. For later reference we note the joint probabilities for Alice and Bob,
and for Alice and Eve,
as well as the individual probabilities for Alice and Bob,
͑32͒
and for Eve,
To get a first rough understanding of the significance of A&B's probabilities ␤ 0 ,␤ 1 and Eve's conditional probabilities 0 , 1 , consider this scenario. A qunit pair has been received by A&B and detected with matched bases. Both Bob and Eve are asked to bet on Alice's nit value. Bob's best strategy is to guess that Alice's value agrees with his own, and he guesses right with probability ␤ 0 , but he is never sure about Alice's nit value. Eve, by contrast, knows Alice's nit value with certainty when detecting the ancilla in one of the k l states of Eq. ͑28͒, and guesses right with probability 0 otherwise. Her total betting odds are thus 1Ϫ␤ 0 ϩ␤ 0 0 . The comparison with Bob's establishes that, if such bets are performed frequently, Bob wins more often if ␤ 0 Ͼ͑nϩ3 ͒␤ 1 , ͑34͒
Eve wins more often if ␤ 0 Ͻ͑nϩ3 ͒␤ 1 , and they come out even if ␤ 0 ϭ͑nϩ3 ͒␤ 1 .
These betting odds are, however, really only a rough measure of Bob's and Eve's knowledge about Alice's nit value, because Eve's information is qualitatively different from Bob's. As discussed in the following section, the ratio ␤ 1 /␤ 0 must be substantially below the 1/(nϩ3) threshold of Eq. ͑34͒ if A&B want to be able to generate a secure key from the raw key sequence that these bets are about.
IV. SECURITY CRITERION

A. Csiszár-Körner threshold
A more systematic quantitative measure of what Bob and Eve know about Alice's nit values is the mutual information between the respective parties. With the probabilities of Eqs. ͑30͒ and ͑32͒, we get
ϭ1ϩ␤ 0 log n ␤ 0 ϩ͑1Ϫ␤ 0 ͒log n ␤ 1 ͑35͒
for the mutual information between Alice and Bob, where, fitting to the n-letter alphabet, the logarithm is taken to base n. Likewise, the mutual information between Alice ͑or Bob͒ and Eve is given by
is shown in Fig. 2 for nϭ2, 3 , 5, 10, and 100 over the ␤ 0 range of Eq. ͑4͒. There, it is a monotonically increasing function of ␤ 0 that grows from ϭϪ1 for ␤ 0 ϭ1/n to ϭ1 for ␤ 0 ϭ1. The values of ␤ 0 , where the sign of changes, are listed in Table I for some n, along with the corresponding values of n␤ 1 /␤ 0 and the ratio 1 / 0 of Eve's conditional probabilities. Now, according to the Csiszár-Körner ͑CK͒ Theorem ͓36͔, a secure cryptographic key can be generated from the raw key sequence, by means of a suitably chosen error correcting code and classical ͑one-way͒ communication between Alice and Bob, if the mutual information between Alice and Bob exceeds that between Eve and either of them. In the present context, this is to say that the tomographic protocol is secure ͑under the incoherent eavesdropping attacks considered͒ if Ͼ0. Moreover, is then the yield of the key generation, in the sense that a secure key of length L can be obtained from a raw key sequence of length L. This invites to call max͕0,͖ the CK yield. It is positive when ␤ 0 is larger than the threshold values of Table I and vanishes at and below the threshold.
Any actual implementation of the tomographic protocol for quantum key distribution needs a reasonable efficiency. The ϭ0 threshold is then of less interest than, say, the ϭ 1 2 threshold at which the CK yield reaches 50%. The respective values of ␤ 0 , n␤ 1 /␤ 0 , and 1 / 0 are also listed in Table I. For sufficiently large n, the threshold values of ␤ 0 are well approximated by
which becomes the strikingly simple ␤ 0 Ϸ 1 2 (1ϩlog n 2) for ϭ0. By comparing with the entries given in the second and fifth columns of Table I , we observe that the error is 1% or less for ϭ0 and nϾ4, or ϭ 1 2 and nϾ3. For ϭ0, 0.3, 0.6, and 0.9, we illustrate ͑38͒ in Fig. 3.   FIG. 2 . The difference , defined in Eq. ͑37͒, of the mutual information between Alice and Bob and between Eve and either one of them, as a function of ␤ 0 , for various values of n. Curves a -e are for nϭ2, 3, 5, 10, and 100, respectively. A secure key can be generated from the raw key sequence if is positive. The threshold value of ␤ 0 , the point of intersection with the ϭ0 line, decreases with increasing n and approaches ␤ 0 ϭ 1 2 for n→ϱ. 3 . Threshold values of ␤ 0 for CK yields of 0%, 30%, 60%, and 90%. As a function of n, with the abscissa linear in log n, the crosses display the exact values of ␤ 0 for which ϭ0 ͑set a), ϭ0.3 ͑set b), ϭ0.6 ͑set c), or ϭ0.9 ͑set d), respectively. The solid lines show the corresponding values of the analytical approximation ͑38͒, which is assuredly good for large n values, but performs remarkably well even for small ones.
B. Channel capacities
It is interesting to view the CK security criterion also from another perspective of information theory. Rather than mutual information, the relevant notion is then that of channel capacity.
The generation of the raw key can be regarded as the outcome of a communication between Alice and Bob through the effective quantum channel of Fig. 1 . By choosing her observables and measuring them, Alice effectively prepares the qunits sent to Bob in the states resulting from the formal procedure of state reduction. For instance, after Alice has measured her mth observable and found ͉m k ͘ for her qunit, her reduced statistical operator for Bob's qunit is
with each k value occurring-or, now, being sent-with probability 1/n. Upon measuring his mth observable, Bob gets the nit value k with probability ␤ 0 and each of the n Ϫ1 other ones with probability ␤ 1 , quite consistent, of course, with the joint probabilities ͑30͒.
These projective measurements carried out by Bob can be interpreted as his attempt to extract the information encoded by Alice in the states k (B,m) , so that, for every m, a certain quantum channel is thus defined between Alice and Bob. Since, for a given m, Bob gets all right nit values with the same probability ␤ 0 /n, and all wrong values with the same probability ␤ 1 /n, we are in fact dealing with a so-called weakly symmetric channel ͓37͔. For a channel of this kind, transmission at full capacity is achieved for totally random input, as is the case here.
All m values are equivalent, and the capacity of each channel, C(A&B)ϭ1ϩ␤ 0 log n ␤ 0 ϩ(1Ϫ␤ 0 )log n ␤ 1 , is just equal to the mutual information I(A&B) of Eq. ͑35͒ ͓38͔. A similar reasoning applies to the effective ancilla channel between Alice and Eve that is associated with Eve's square-root measurement. The capacity C(A&E) of this channel is also equal to the corresponding mutual information I(A&E) of Eq. ͑36͒.
It follows that the CK threshold criterion for the tomographic protocol has a simple intuitive meaning: secure oneway communication is possible if the capacity of the channel between Alice and Bob is higher than the capacity of the channel between Alice and Eve.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The protocol for quantum key distribution that is described and analyzed in this paper differs from other protocols by the element of complete quantum state tomography. For this purpose, Alice and Bob exploit the measurement results they obtain for unmatched bases, rather than just discarding these data as one does in the BB84 protocol and its various generalizations. The check for a violation of Bell's inequality in the E91 protocol amounts to a partial state tomography and, in this sense, our tomographic protocol might be viewed as a refinement and generalization of the E91 protocol.
In the tomographic protocol, Alice and Bob insist on the source emitting entangled two-qunit states of a particular form-only states from a one-parametric family are in fact regarded as acceptable-and thereby they limit Eve's choice of eavesdropping attacks stringently. Up to unitary equivalence, there is then only one preparation by Eve of the qunit pairs, entangled with her ancilla states, that gives her best knowledge of the raw key sequence obtained by Alice and Bob. But even with this optimized eavesdropping attack, Eve does not acquire enough information to prevent Alice and Bob from generating a secure key, provided that the twoqunit state is in the parameter range where the Csiszár-Körner theorem applies. Alice and Bob find out whether this is the case when they determine the parameters of the twoqunit state by state tomography. But the story does not end here. If the source emits states outside the parameter regime where an immediate key generation is possible, Alice and Bob might still be able to achieve their objective although it seems that Eve knows too much. They just need to first ''distill'' a better raw key, for which purpose they can choose between the quantum procedure of entanglement distillation ͓39,40͔ and the classical procedure of advantage distillation ͓41͔. Recent work establishes ͓42͔ that both procedures are applicable if ␤ 0 Ͼ2␤ 1 and only then, which is, therefore, the true threshold condition for the tomographic protocol.
The square-root measurement, on which the present analysis of Eve's incoherent attack is based ͑and also the analysis in Ref. ͓42͔͒, maximizes Eve's odds of guessing Alice's nit values right but, as noted by Shor ͓43͔, it does not always maximize her information about them. In other words, it may happen that a ͑slightly͒ larger value of the mutual information between Alice and Eve obtains for another measurement. The only case on record for which this is known to occur is, however, a very flat nϭ3 pyramid of states, outside the physical parameter range of Eq. ͑4͒. Other cases are likely to exist, possibly also for larger n values and rather tall pyramids. If so, the CK threshold values would be changed ͑slightly͒, but presently there is no indication that the ␤ 0 Ͼ2␤ 1 condition for successful distillation is affected. These matters are not settled as yet, systematic investigations are being performed, and results will be reported in due course.
In protocols of the BB84 type, Alice prepares qunits and sends them to Bob, with Eve eavesdropping on the quantum channel. As discussed in Sec. IV B, one method of preparation could be to detect one qunit of an entangled pair, thereby reducing the state of the other, which is on its way to Bob. In the setup of Fig. 1 this would amount to having, so to say, the source inside Alice's laboratory. It follows that our analysis has a bearing also on schemes of the BB84 type. Reversing the argument, no matter how Alice prepares the qunit sent to Bob, she can treat her record of it as if it were the result of a measurement on another qunit, be it real or virtual. Alice and Bob can then treat their joint records as if the data referred to entangled qunit pairs, and apply the tomographic protocol. In effect, this limits Eve's choice of eavesdropping attacks on the quantum channel in an analogous way and, as a consequence, our results are also applicable to tomographic protocols of this other kind.
In the security analysis of protocols of BB84 type, Eve is assumed to intercept the qunits in transmission, to use some cloning device for copying the qunit state with the fidelity permitted by quantum limitations, and to perform eventually a suitable measurement on the quantum copy. It is in this context of single-qunit protocols that relations equivalent to Eq. ͑25͒ were first derived for qutrits (nϭ3) by Bruß and Macchiavello ͓9,44͔, and conjectured to hold for arbitrary n ͓9,45͔. Also, the ␤ 0 Ͼ2␤ 1 threshold condition for both distillation procedures applies to BB84-type qunit protocols ͓45,46͔. And for the question about the optimality of Eve's square-root measurement in the tomographic protocol, there is an analogous question about the optimal cloning device in single-qunit protocols. In view of these close interrelations, a definite answer to one of them will surely teach us a lesson about the other question too.
